Abstract-The global move towards producing and consuming energy in a clean, efficient and economical way, along with the need for meeting rising consumer demand has led to significant advancements in the design of the smart grid infrastructure. However, the potential of the smart grid remains limited without the integration of renewable energy sources. Energy trading is one way forward. This refers to the transfer of energy from an entity producing surplus energy to one with a deficit, within a certain timeframe. In this paper, we present a detailed review of the literature surrounding the application of game theoretic (GT) methods to scenarios in energy trading. Two levels (layers) of trading are identified and the latest achievements within them are summarised. An extensive description of a complete GT-based energy trading framework is presented, including a taxonomy of GT and an introduction to the smart grid architecture with a focus on renewable energy generation and energy storage. Finally, we present a critical evaluation of the current shortcomings and identify areas for future research.
A key element in making this work is the integration of renewable energy (RE) sources. Inspired by Swanson's law [4] , the persistent trend of price reduction for solar panels by 20 per cent for every doubling in produced panels between 1976 and 2014, one can expect many more homes to be equipped with their own small-scale power plant in the future. To extract most value from them, there is a need for thorough understanding of this technology. Fortunately, the introduction of smart meters means that one can access a lot more data to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, suitable models are needed to utilise this data and make energy usage more efficient. In particular local energy trading among or within multiple MGs yields promising perspectives, as we point out in this survey. Energy trading refers to the transfer of energy from an entity that produces more energy than it needs to an entity with a deficit within a certain time interval. It is usually assumed that the demand could also be satisfied from the macrogrid, but at a higher cost. The task is to find optimal strategies for each entity such that the overall costs for the community are minimised.
Additionally, this brings several technical advantages. First of all, the inherent local usage of energy in such a system results in better power quality, i.e., minimal voltage fluctuations, and even more directly in less line loss [5] . Secondly, the system is more reliable, as it is safe from outages of the macrogrid.
A trading model needs to evaluate the behaviour of all participants and incorporates their individual preferences. As the actions of one influences all the others, Game Theory (GT) is a suitable method to choose. In general, game theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with the analysis of games, where the outcome of one player does not only depend on his own strategy but also on the strategies of the other participants. It was first introduced for problems in economics [6] , but is nowadays applied in many areas such as biology [7] [8] [9] and computer science [10] . The game-theoretic approach is internalising the decentralised structure of the smart grid. Another method that tackles the energy trading problem is based on single objective optimisation [11] [12] [13] . It uses a rather centralised approach, where an independent controller is in charge of solving the optimisation problem of finding the amount of energy traded such that generation and transportation costs are minimised. As seen in Section III, this central unit might seemingly be active in the game scenario as well, but note that here it only helps to communicate between the individuals instead of rendering the decisions. 
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The main contributions of this review are the following: (i) an extensive description of a complete GT-based energy trading framework. This includes a taxonomy of GT and an introduction to smart grid architecture focussing on renewable energy generation and energy storage. (ii) a detailed review of relevant literature about energy trading using game-theoretic methodology. We specify two different levels (layers) of trading and summarise and contrast the latest achievements within them. The paper is structured as follows: Section II starts with a brief historical background of GT and then focusses on a taxonomy tailored to the concepts that are relevant for the reviewed trading scenarios. Section III comprises three parts: a smart grid architecture overview, renewable energy generation, and energy storage. The key contributions of the latest literature is then summarised in Section IV. We conclude with a critical evaluation of the current shortcomings.
For the convenience of the reader we summarise all abbreviations used in the survey in Table I. II. GAME THEORY BASICS In this section, a brief overview of the vast field of game theory is given, focussing on the concepts that are of relevance to energy trading in the smart grid. For the interested reader, who seeks a more extensive insight into game theory, suitable references are provided whenever appropriate.
A. Brief History
John von Neumann is regarded as the founder of modern game theory. In 1928, he proved the "min-max-theorem" [14] which provides a solution concept for a "zero-sum game". Later in 1944, he applied his approach to analyse economically motivated problems [6] .
A more general solution concept was developed by John Forbes Nash in 1951 which is now refered to as Nash equilibrium (NE) [15] . An NE describes a strategic choice for each player which is best in the sense that nobody has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from it. The beliefs of each player are here captured by numerical values; in mathematical terms this is done via a utility function. One talks about the utility or payoff for a player given a certain action.
Since then, many notions that are still relevant nowadays followed in quick succession, leading to no less than five Nobel Memorial Prizes in Economic Sciences for game theorists [16]- [20] . In the following subsection, we highlight the survey-relevant achievements following the graphical taxonomy in Fig. 1 .
B. Taxonomy
At the most abstract level, one can classify games in direct and indirect. The first studies games in form of finding optimal strategies for the players (cf. [6] ), while the latter, also known as mechanism design, is concerned with designing games such that certain outcomes will be achieved by rational players (cf. [21] ). As mechanism design has not played a significant role in energy trading to this point in time, we concentrate only on direct games.
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , we distinguish between direct games based on the characteristics of its players. They might either be social or selfish, leading to cooperative (coalitional) and non-cooperative games, respectively. In the following subsections it becomes clear that this leads to rather different scenarios, modelling and analysing strategies.
1) Coalitional Games:
As coalitional games so far do not play a major role in the context of energy trading. For completeness, we shortly summarise their main concepts and refer to Shoham and Leyton-Brown's textbook for a thorough treatment [21] .
Instead of finding the best strategy for each player, cooperative games answer the following two questions:
(i) Which coalition will form? (ii) How to divide the payoff obtained by the grand coalition? There are two established approaches two answer these questions. The first one, called Shapley value, is based on a notion of fairness [22] . Assuming everybody takes part in the coalition the Shapley value represents the outcome for each participant by an amount that is proportional to his respective marginal contribution, and thus fair.
The second solution concept is called the core and is based on stability of coalitions. The core is a set of payment allocations, for which all players choose to participate in the given coalition [23] . The grand coalition, where every participant takes part, is said to be stable if there is no subcoalition which has a benefit of deviating.
2) Non-cooperative Games: To characterise a noncooperative -or strategic -game we talk about the mode of playing and the information each player possesses. There are certainly more criteria to categorise, but these are sufficient to cover the important aspects for our analysis in later sections.
(i) Frequency of play: Here we differ between games that are played once and games that are repeatedly played. The repetition of the exact same game with the exact same opponent usually results in different behaviours, as the players have to consider the impact of their actions on the opponent for the next round. Furthermore, it is significant whether one talks about a finitely or infinitely repeated game, as in the first Game theory taxonomy, with a focus on direct games. This graphic summarises important categorisation aspects for non-cooperative games.
Tree-structure illustration of Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Arrows represent possible moves: Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S). Each leaf shows the utility function for both players, i.e., (outcome player 1, outcome player 2). The dotted line shows that player 2 is not aware of which move was played by player 1. case the chance to react might not be given. The utility for such games is usually a (weighted) average over the payoffs of each round. The closely related topic of learning in games is discussed in [21] .
(ii) Chronology of play: As shown in Fig. 1 , chronology refers to either simultaneous or sequential games. In a sequential game players move in turns and eventually reach the end of the game where the outcome is defined by a utility function. Moreover, in each turn players might have different actions available. In contrast to sequential games, players of simultaneous games do not have the ability to react to their opponent. Here, they choose their action at the same time. This is why they are also called 'one-shot' or 'static' games.
Note that there is an important difference between a repeated static game and a sequential game. Comparing several rounds of rock-paper-scissors (repeated game) with a game of chess (sequential game) should make this difference clearer. After each round of rock-paper-scissors the players obtain a payoff and can choose between the same three options in the next round. On the contrary, in chess, the move set might alter after each turn and there is only one final result at the end of the game.
A very important class of sequential games are Stackelberg games [24] . They originated within an economic application where an established company and a startup compete for market share. The sequential nature is expressed by the burden (or chance) of the bigger company to move first, while the startup can react to the respective decision. More general, the game exhibits a leader-follower structure.
A way to represent sequential games is in form of a tree structure (cf. Fig. 2 ). Each node stands for a certain player and the links originating at the node show his current move set. As mentioned above, the utility function is only defined for the leafs of the tree, which makes the analysis of such games more difficult, as no inbetween evaluation is available. Nevertheless, a solution concept was developed called 'subgame perfect Nash equilibrium' [25] . A subgame is a game that has one of the nodes of the original game as its root and considers only the descendants of this node. An equilibrium that is also equilibrium for all subgames qualifies as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In practical applications we can obtain this solution by backward induction [21] . The backward induction algorithm defines values for the utility at each node of the tree. The equilibrium is then achieved by best response at every node. Unfortunately, the procedure might be intractable, for instance for chess or go, as the number of possible board configurations is extremely large [26] .
Neumann [14] pointed out that one could model a static game as a sequential game with players being unaware of the other player's move. His idea leads to the next classifier.
(iii) Awareness of players: In the literature, one usually refers to perfect and imperfect information. The game of chess serves as a good example of a perfect information game. At every stage of the game, in theory each player knows exactly about the history and in principle (though intractable) about all future moves and their respective outcomes. In an imperfect information game, each player still knows about the whole structure of the game, all the utility values, and all possible actions, but they just do not know at which exact root in the tree they are. For instance in Fig. 2 , player 2 is not aware of which move was played by player 1 and has thus imperfect information of the game.
(iv) Knowledge of players: The previous example showed a complete (but imperfect) information game. There is a subtle but significant difference between the notions of awareness and knowledge. If the knowledge of a player is incomplete, he might not know about the payoffs, strategies, or structure of the game. In a series of papers from 1967-68 [27] [28] [29] , Harsanyi gave a first formal definition of such a game, for which he later obtained the Nobel prize. He introduced the notion of the 'type' of a player in which all his private information and beliefs are summarised. Myerson, a Nobel Laureate himself, wrote a very good review from a modern point of view almost 40 years later [30] . A key realisation for Harsanyi was that all uncertainties about the game can be captured by uncertainties about the payoffs. Nowadays, such a game is referred to as Bayesian game and mathematically consists of 5 ingredients: (1) a set of players, (2) a set of actions for each player, (3) a set of types for each player, (4) payoff functions for all combination of types and actions for each player, (5) a common prior probability function over the types of each player. The last one describes the believes of all players about another player's type.
III. SMART GRID ARCHITECTURE
In order to cope with ever increasing higher demand, while reducing GHG emissions, a smarter power grid structure is needed. But what is wrong with the existing one? As energy is sent from a central large power station over long high voltage lines to substations, which distribute the energy in low voltage subgrids, a failure at a substation could consequently lead to wide area outages. This drawback directly results from the centralised architecture. A more general problem is that energy is consumed directly from its production. During high demand intervals balancing demand and supply to guarantee stability is critical. The utility company needs to respond with very costly fast energy generation via peak spinning reserves [31] . Last but not least, large energy transmission distances result in high losses, and thus low efficiency [5] .
The new generation of grids first and foremost tackles the problem of decentralisation. We see in the subsequent subsections that the smart architecture comprises many (almost) self-sustaining MGs which produce their own energy locally. Additionally, the one-way communication and transmission links are replaced by two-way communication and transmission links. The key elements for self-sustained operation and a green future are renewable energy generation and suitable energy storage systems.
Within this section, an illustration of a smart grid that agrees with the models used in Section IV is described. Subsequent sections deal with the technological challenges of wind and solar power generation and energy storage systems. Based on decentralisation and two way communication and energy transfer, a layered structure from the macrogrid on the top to an individual smart home at the bottom is shown. Layer A shows a collection of multiple MGs that are able to exchange energy among each other and communicate through a central unit. Layer B shows the structure within an MG, highlighting the fact that it consists not only of smart homes but also RE generation and medium scale storage facilities. Similar to the layer above it, a central unit manages the direct exchange of energy between the entities. The smart home at the bottom possesses a smart meter that allows it to communicate with its individual RE generation, energy storage system, and various household appliances.
A. Architecture Overview Fig. 3 gives an overview of a smart power grid as envisioned in parts by the authors of the papers under review in Section IV. Its inherent decentralised structure is best understood by looking at it from the bottom to the top. The bottom panel is an abstract representation of how a household of the future might look like, i.e., a smart home. Through its own renewable energy generation and energy storage system, it is able to function independently from the main grid. Nevertheless, this is only opted for in emergency situations as the generation A microgrid is a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island-mode. It might also include small scale industry, but as this is so far not considered in the literature in the context of energy trading, we will not further elaborate on it. For privacy reasons, it is assumed that smart homes are only able to transfer energy between each other and the storage and generation facilities, whereas all the communication and organisation of such is managed by an independent central operator. In many scenarios we review in Section IV, the energy trading algorithms are implemented and executed through the operator.
Layer A in Fig. 3 combines multiple MGs. Similar to within an MG, the communication is managed by a central unit, while energy transfer is still possible directly between the MGs. Energy from the utility companies is fed in through the macrostation which connects to the macrogrid via high voltage, long distance power lines.
B. Renewable Energy Generation
Future generation of renewable energy on the smart home and MG level will rely heavily on wind and solar technologies. Following their nature, they are usually referred to as variable renewable energy sources. To make them work reliably and efficiently, there are several technical and economical challenges as outlined below.
The variability and uncertainty can be seen for instance in the fact that solar output can change rapidly with the appearance of clouds, or that on average, a wind farm produces 40 per cent of the time of the year, making it very hard to predict the hourly output [34] . Another challenge is to balance supply and demand in scarcity and surplus situations, especially for solar power, where the highest production rates are achieved during the day which does not coincide with the usual demand of a working household. Solutions to these problems are mainly based on better forecasting [35] [36] [37] [38] and demand-side response [34] , [39] [40] [41] .
Forecasting techniques based on statistical models and artificial neural networks are used to tackle variability and uncertainty with great success. Vaz et al. [38] showed that by incorporating data from neighbouring PV systems they can forecast PV power production for the next month within small error margins at 15 minute granularity. Similar achievements were obtained by Shayanfar et al. [37] for wind power prediction.
The load-balancing problem is mainly approached from two different sides: Demand-response systems and energy storage. As shown for instance in [42] , [43] , utility companies reduce the peak-to-average ratio (PAR) of the demand by implementing pricing incentives to shift loads to 'less busy' times. A more direct approach is the utilisation of energy storage systems, allowing the user to save surplus energy for times of low production. There are many different technical realisations, the most important ones are discussed in the following subsection.
Aside from the technical difficulties, there are also economical challenges that come with the integration of renewable energy generation. The most significant of these are the capital-intensive grid upgrades. New offshore wind farms ask for new power lines and additional rooftop PVs might accelerate fatigue of existing components. Solutions range from dynamic line rating [34] to better load-forecasting [44] and grid scale energy storage systems. Wang et al. [41] presented a cooperative planning framework for MGs, where they analysed realistic weather data from Hong Kong to establish the best compromise in location and investment allocation of wind and solar farms.
C. Energy Storage
As already sketched in the previous paragraphs, the benefits of energy storage systems cannot be overlooked. Not only that they help to balance the operation with diurnal renewable generation but also make fast reacting, high-emitting peak power plants obsolete [32] . Moreover, they contribute to an overall improvement of chain efficiency and smoothing of frequency and voltage fluctuations. In the end, this results in a more reliable and secure network.
In this section we focus on electricity energy storage (EES), which convert electricity into another form of energy and can then restore electricity back from it. A comprehensive classification overview over this subclass and others can be found in [32] . A categorisation of EES systems is usually done by which immediate energy form is used: Mechanical systems store the energy in form of kinetic or potential energy by pumping, compressing, or accelerating. Electrochemical batteries make use of reversible reactions. And electrical energy storage systems exploit electrical fields. For each of these subcategories a summary of important technologies, their advantages and disadvantages, and their power scale is shown in Table II . The scale ranges from small to large, which can be imagined to be sufficient to power one household to a whole city for a day.
Let us briefly connect these storage technologies to the layered grid structure. When talking about community based storage, i.e., layer A and layer B of Fig. 3 , virtually any type is used. In contrast, smart home storage is almost completely based on electrochemical energy storage. In particular lithiumion batteries are widely employed, as they are insensitive to temperature, have long lifetimes, need little maintenance, and can be produced to store enough energy to run a household for one or two days completely independently [45] . Additionally, over their whole life cycle they are also cheaper than the alternative lead-acid batteries [46] .
IV. GAME THEORY FOR ENERGY TRADING
In this section, we look at the latest achievements of game theoretic approaches in energy trading. Following the structure of the smart grid architecture shown in Fig. 3 , we divide the summary into two parts, one focussing on trading among MGs (layer A) and the other focussing on trading within an MG (layer B). In Table III , the specific scenarios, methods and results of each paper are summarised.
A. Trading in Layer A: Between the MGs
In 2011, Saad et al. [47] investigate quite a futuristic scenario for that time: They consider groups of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) that are able to sell their stored energy back to the main grid. A group consists of 500 to 1000 individual PHEVs with a surplus of energy of more than half their total capacity. One could more generally identify each group as an MG, but since the notion of MGs has not been established at that time the authors did not make use of it.
Each group acts as a player of a non-cooperative game and decides on a strategy corresponding to an amount of energy that it is willing to trade. The utility function incorporates the trading and reservation prices, the amount of energy to sell, and a term that summarises costs for discharging the batteries. By means of a double auction 1 , the players are incentivised to truthfully reveal their reservation price.
The game is solved iteratively: starting with an initial strategy of selling all the surplus energy, the sellers take turns replying with their respective best response to the current strategy played by all the other participants. During these steps, the energy company serves as the auctioneer directing the communications (cf. central unit A in Fig. 3 ). It is shown that the proposed algorithm on average converges to a NE in a reasonable amount of iterations. Compared against a greedy algorithm, in which each seller tries to sell as much energy as possible, the average utility of a group of PHEVs is higher using the game theoretic approach.
Over the course of time, the idea of MGs became more and more commonly accepted. Lee et al. [48] study the trading of energy among those MGs. In fact, the MGs do not directly trade with each other but rather try to sell surplus energy to the market or buy required energy from it. This is similar to the architecture described in Section III, where the MGs are only able to communicate with a central unit, which serves as a mediator between the MGs, and between the MGs and the macrogrid. It is assumed that sellers might want to keep parts of their superfluous energy for later time periods, while buyers may buy even more energy than needed, possibly for later trading.
In the multileader-multifollower Stackelberg game proposed, the sellers act as leaders and the buyers act as followers. The specific utility functions for both groups are set up in a way that achieve a certain level of fairness. This means, the surplus energy offered by the sellers is allocated to all the buyers proportional to their bids, and the payment from the buyers to the sellers is proportional to their sales volume. Due to the specific definition of the sellers' utility, a convenient simplification of the analysis arises. It turns out that the payoff for each seller does only depend on his own strategy and the decision of the buyers. As a result, one only needs to run an optimisation algorithm to maximise the seller's utility given the buyer's strategies.
The equilibrium solution for the non-cooperative game among the buyers is given in closed-form and only depends on the selling price and the number of players. A neat and reasonable result for the social welfare of both the leaders and followers with respect to the number of buyers is shown. Due to the increasing competition between the buyers, their social welfare monotonically decreases with their number. At the same time, the social welfare for the sellers increases, because they tend to sell more when the number of buyers increases.
Similar to the research in [48] , the architecture shown in [49] comprises a number of MGs that are connected with the market/aggregator through which they are enabled to trade excess energy. For security reasons, all communications are organised through the central independent operating unit. Viewed from the perspective of any of the MGs, this leads to an incomplete information game, as nobody knows about the strategies and payoffs of the others.
In more detail, the authors divide the MGs into sellers and buyers, and design a two stage Stackelberg game in which each of these groups tries to find their best actions by means of a reinforcement learning algorithm. The same distribution and paying principles as in [48] based on proportionality are applied. This means there are two utility functions, one for each of the groups of buyers and sellers.
Even without explicit knowledge of the strategies of the other participants, it is shown that the learning algorithm converges to a best reply which is equivalent to the solution of the corresponding optimisation problem for the sellers and buyers, respectively. The tradeoff for the increased privacy is the slower convergence of the iterative scheme. In comparison to the iterative solutions found in [53] , [54] it takes roughly 100 times more iterations until convergence. Nevertheless, in a test case similar to the IEEE 37-bus test [56] , the algorithm does in fact converge to the NE, or at least to the closest best response for scenarios where the NE is not part of the action set.
Li et al. [50] tackle the problem of reliability in a scenario with multiple MGs similar to Fig. 3 . They argue that the inherent uncertain nature of the renewable energy will lead to uncertainty of demand and supply, thus risking the stability of the system. With that motivation they model a central aggregator that wants to maximise the profit for each MG while minimising the risk of overbidding, i.e., declaring surplus resources which cannot be supplied at the time of trading.
To achieve this, they incorporate a two-settlement market model with a forward-and a spot-stage. In the forward market the aggregator sets an expected energy price given the total expected quantity of surplus energy. In the spot market, this expected supply might not be achieved and is thus penalised by the aggregator. Both stages are mathematically combined in a payoff function which is complemented by the conditional value-at-risk measurement to obtain a utility function each MG wants to maximize in a stochastic game.
Due to the uncertainty embodied in the utility function the existence of a deterministic NE cannot be assured nor calculated. Instead the authors propose an algorithm to approach the stochastic NE by a sample average approximated NE, which they prove to exist. The results show the influence of the risk on the bidding of the MGs. MGs with high uncertainty will commit to less supply compared to MGs that feel certain.
Park et al. [51] also make use of the 'layer A' structure shown in Fig.3 . The difference here is that the central unit is not only responsible for the communication but also serves as a gatherer and distributor of the energy that is traded among the MGs. For that reason it is assumed to have a rather large storage capacity, sufficient to store all surplus energy of the MGs that produced more energy than needed in a specified time frame.
Unlike all the other papers reviewed in this section, there is no pricing scheme proposed to pay the sellers. By providing energy to the system the respective MG collects points that increases its contribution value. If it runs into a shortage of energy itself at a later time, a high contribution value will allow it to take a bigger chunk of the energy provided by others at that time. All this is organised by the central distributor, whose goal is to maximise a social welfare function. Park et al. show in their paper that the solution to this problem can be understood as a water-filling problem [57] . Each request of energy is represented by a tank of proportional volume and width equal to the contribution value.
As this distribution mechanism is known to every consumer, the non-cooperative game they play deals with the question of how much energy to request. The reason for not simply requesting all the necessary energy to cover the demand is that the tanks are positioned on a base which scales with this amount. The players have to find a strategy in which they are served early enough through the water-filling mechanism while minimising the amount of energy necessary to require from the main grid. A nice property of the NE for this case is that even if participants deviate from it, the others will not be influenced negatively. This is shown analytically as well as numerically. Moreover, the run time of the algorithm is short, allowing for practical implementation.
B. Trading in Layer B: Within a MG
The idea of using EVs as the future electricity storage units that can also take you from A to B, is considered in the paper by Kim et al. [52] . They design a non-cooperative scheduling game for the battery where the users decide between charging the battery, using stored energy for their appliances, or selling stored energy back to the grid. All this is set up in an environment of multiple customers that are connected to an aggregator, which is itself connected to the main grid. Participants will declare their expected demand for the following day to the aggregator, allowing him to organise the distribution. The fact that they deal with EVs instead of stationary batteries is modelled within a constraint that denotes times of the day where it can be neither charged nor discharged.
Since the aggregator is interested in making a profit on his own, a tiered billing function is implemented that charges a higher price for heavy users, i.e., users that demand more energy than average. This can also be seen as a measure of fairness, as otherwise these heavy users would drive up the price for all the other users. The need for such a pricing mechanism is justified, because the model is applied to a mixture of residential and industrial customers.
Another consideration to safeguard the aggregator is the incorporation of uncertainty. Whether talking about the uncertainty of weather conditions or the rightfulness of the declared behaviour of the participants, it will eventually lead to uncertainty in the demand. It is assumed that these variations can be bounded by the aggregator based on historical knowledge. Ensuing from the worst-case scenario leads to the analysis of a robust game. Tests show that this increases the social welfare more than twice. More generally, they show that the trading ability improves the social welfare outcome.
Without using the term directly, Tushar et al. [53] describe an architecture we can nowadays identify as an MG. They look at a situation in which a central power station (CPS) cannot cope with the high demand during peak hours and thus buys the needed energy from what they call energy consumers (ECs). These ECs are represented by EVs, RE farms, and smart homes, i.e. different grid participants that posses energy storage devices and a communication link to the CPS.
Instead of optimizing each individuals' utility, here the authors describe a non-cooperative Stackelberg game that opts to achieve a social optimal solution. With this they assure that each player can benefit from participating in the energy trading, implementing a pricing model where the unit energy price might differ for different ECs. The model rewards a higher unit energy price to ECs that can only provide small amounts of surplus energy compared to participants with large surpluses.
The results show that the iterative algorithm, that minimises the costs for the CPS and simultaneously maximises the social welfare of the ECs, converges quickly and reliably in 1000 independent simulation runs. Comparisons to a standard feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme show improvement on average utility per EC and reduced costs for the CPS.
The first paper that considers energy storage in the context of scheduling and reducing PAR is [54] . They start by designing a smart energy cost function under the conditions that (i) it is an increasing, strictly convex function, (ii) it pays users to sell energy, and (iii) the price for buying from the utility company is always higher than selling the same amount of energy. These restrictions lead to a stable system with a unique optimum. In order to formulate a scheduling problem, shiftable and non-shiftable appliances are taken as a starting point. Furthermore, it is assumed that the total load of each consumer at a certain time interval of the following day is described by the sum of external power that is bought from the grid, internal power from his own storage device, and an amount that is used to charge his batteries.
Starting from this initial setup, two different games are proposed. In the first one -a non-cooperative game -the utility sets a cost function that is valid for the following day and the consumers play a 'scheduling-game' searching for a strategy that will minimize their respective costs. As users are allowed to sell energy back to the grid, this runs into the phenomenon of a 'reverse peak', which happens when users buy extra energy at times of low costs and sell it during peak hours. The second game provides a solution to overcome this problem by making the utility company a participant of the game. It can then adjust the prices in response to the schedules proposed by the consumers. This is a typical leader-follower structure that defines the Stackelberg game (see section II).
A strong result of this paper is the formal proof that the Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to the solution that minimises PAR. Moreover, their simulations provide evidence that (i) scheduling with storage always outperforms scheduling without storage in terms of PAR and cost, (ii) in a scenario with selling back only the total amount of storage matters, and (iii) the consumption profile for the Stackelberg case is almost perfectly flat.
The focus of [55] lies on a more local scenario of energy trading, i.e, between individual households. To this end, a neighbourhood of up to 50 users is modelled, dividing the consumers into sellers and buyers. In their scenario the sellers have the freedom to specify the price for which they want to give away surplus energy as long as it is smaller than the energy price from the main grid. The buyers will play a noncooperative game in which they decide on how much energy to buy from which seller. To point out the local character of this trading, the utility function favours transactions with sellers that are close, i.e., with least power line hops between buyer and seller.
Similar to the examples in [47] , [53] , [54] the solution to the game is achieved by an iterative procedure during which buyers exchange best replies to each others' strategies until nobody wants to deviate any more. On the one hand, the clear advantage is that there is no need for a centralised operator managing the transactions. On the other hand, this method might raise privacy concerns among the users as they need to reveal their information to all the other participants.
For testing the game results, the authors also describe a centralised optimisation model which minimises the total system bill. The comparison between the methods shows that even though the buyers in the game try to minimise their individual energy bill, none of them achieves a lower bill than in the centralised optimisation. Furthermore, it is shown that the iterative algorithm converges fairly fast.
V. CONCLUSION
In Section IV, we reviewed state of the art concepts for energy trading using game theoretic methods and summarised the ideas in Table III . The results show considerable progress has already been made, however many gaps remain giving rise to interesting research questions.
Arguably, the biggest gap stems from the usage of data. In many of the scenarios shown, customers are classified as sellers or buyers, based on whether they have a surplus of energy or not. There are barely any models that combine a high quality analysis of demand data with that of renewable energy generation in the context of energy trading. In fact only one of the papers in Table III directly incorporates RE. As already highlighted in Section III, it is exactly the uncertain and variable nature of the renewables that can cause problems and thus they must be considered more rigorously. Bayesian games provide the mathematical framework for incorporating uncertainties, however only little work has been done in this direction. Closely related to this is the lack of long term, quantitative propositions, opposing the merely one-day ahead analyses in most works on energy trading. With this, one could include seasonal effects of RE generation and householddemand thereby resulting in a more realistic model.
We propose a thorough end-to-end framework for energy trading, i.e., one that makes use of all the available data to answer (not exclusively) the following questions:
• Which users benefit most from the installation of storage and RE generation? • What are the quantitative savings for each household?
• How do seasonal effects influence trading behaviour?
• What is the payback time of RE investments in this scenario?
